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lntentio Lectoris
The State of the Art

Umberto Eco

1.

INTRODUCTION

During the last decades we have witnessed a change of
paradigm in the theories of textual interpretation. Within a structuralistic framework, to take into account the role of the addressee
seemed like a disturbing intrusion since the current dogma was
that a textual structure should be analyzed in itself and for the
sake of itself, in an attempt to isolate its formal structures.
On the contrary, during the seventies literary theorists-as
well as linguists and semioticians-had focused on the pragmatic
aspect of reading. The dialectic between Author and Reader, Sender and Addressee, Narrator and Narratee has generated a crowd,
indeed impressive, of semiotic or extrafictional narrators, subjects
of the uttered utterance (enonciationenoncee), focalizers, voices,
metanarrators, as well as an equally impressive crowd of virtual,
ideal, implied or implicit, model, projected, presumed, informed
readers, metareaders, archireaders, and so on.
As a result, different critical theories-such as the aesthetics
of reception, hermeneutics, the semiotic theories of interpretative
cooperation, reader-response criticism, up to the scarcely homoThis paper originally given as part of the Queens College Visiting Humanist
Series in the Fall of 1987.
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geneous archipelago of deconstruction-have
appointed as the
main object of their research not so much the empirical results of
given personal or collective acts of reading (studied by a sociology
of reception), but the very function of construction--or deconstruction--of a text performed by its interpreter-insofar
as such
a function is implemented, encouraged, prescribed, or permitted
by the textual linear manifestation or by the very nature of
semiosis.
It seems to me that the general assumption underlying each
of these theories is: The functioning of a text (including non-verbal
ones) can be explained by taking into account not only its generative process but also (or, for the most radical theories, exclusively)
the role performed by the addressee and (at most) the way in
which the text foresees and directs this kind of interpretative
cooperation.
It must also be stressed that such an addressee-oriented
approach concerns not only literary and artistic texts, but every
sort of semiotic phenomenon, including everyday linguistic utterances, visual signals, and so on. In other words, addresseeoriented theories assume that the meaning of every message
depends on the interpretative choices of its receptor; even the
meaning of the most univocal message uttered in the course of
the most normal communicative intercourse depends on the response of its addressee, and this response is in some way contextsensitive. Naturally, such an allegedly open-ended nature of messages is more evident in those texts that have been conceived in
order to magnify this semiotic possibility, that is, in so-called
artistic texts. I insist on this point because during the previous
decades artistic texts were taken as the only phenomenon able to
display, provocatively, the still unacknowledged open-ended nature of texts. On the contrary, in the last decades such a nature
has been theoretically rooted in the very nature of any kind of
text. In other words, before the change of the paradigm, artistic
texts were seen as the only cases in which a semiotic system, be
it verbal or otherwise, magnified the role of the addressee-the
basic and normal function of such a system being instead that of
allowing an ideal condition of univocality, independently of the
idiosyncrasies of the receiver. On the contrary, in the last decades,
semiotic theories have insisted on the fact that-even though in
everyday life we are obliged to exchange many univocal messages,
hardly working in order to reduce ambiguity-the
dialectic between sender, addressee, and context is at the very core of
semiosis.
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2. ARCHAEOLOGY

Undoubtedly the universe of literary studies has been haunted
in the last few years by the ghost of the reader. To prove this
assumption it will be interesting to ascertain how and to what
extent such a ghost has been conjured up by different theorists,
coming from different theoretical traditions.
The first who explicitly spoke of an "implied author" ("carrying the reader with him") was certainly Wayne Booth in 1961.
After him we can isolate two independent lines of research that,
up to a certain point, ignored each other: namely, the semioticostructural one and the hermeneutic one.
The first line stems from Communications8, where Barth es
spoke of a material author who cannot be identified with the
narrator, Todorov evoked the couple, "image of the narratorimage of the author," and recovered the Anglo-Saxon theories of
the point of view (from Henry James, Percy Lubbock, Forster,
until Pouillon 1946), and Genette started to elaborate the categories
(definitely dealt with in 1972) of voice and focalization. Then,
through some observations of Kristeva (1970) on "textual productivity," certain lucid pages of Lotman (1970), the still empirical
concept of archilecteurby Riffaterre (1971), the discussions on the
conservative standpoint of Hirsch (1967), the debate reached the
most complex notions of implied reader in Corti (1976) and Chatman (1978). It is interesting to remark that the last two authors
drew their definition directly from Booth, ignoring the similar
definition proposed by Iser in 1972. The same happened to me
as I elaborated my notion of Model Reader along the mainstream
of the semiotic-structuralistic line, matching these results with
some suggestions borrowed from various discussions on the
modal logic of narrativity (mainly van Djik, Petofi, and Schmidt)
as well as from some hints furnished by Weinrich-not to mention
the idea of an "ideal reader" devised by Joyce in FinnegansWake.
It is also interesting to remark that Corti (1976) traces back
the discussion on the non-empirical author to Foucault (1969)
where, in a post-structuralistic atmosphere, the problem is posed
of an author as a "way of being within the discourse," as a field
of conceptual coherence, or as a stylistic unity, which as such
could not but elicit the corresponding idea of a reader as a way
of recognizing such a being-within-the-discourse.
The second lineage is represented by Iser (1972), who starts
from Booth's proposal but elaborates his suggestion on the basis
of a different tradition (Ingarden, Gadamer, and naturally Jauss-
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who in his turn was developing some of the suggestions of the
Russian Formalists and the Prague School). Iser was also largely
influenced (as is demonstrated by the bibliographical references
of Der implizite Leser)by the Anglo-Saxon theorists of narrativity
(well known to Todorov and Genette) and by Joyce (criticism).
One finds in the first Iser book few references to the structuralistic
lineage (the only important source is Mukatovsky). It is only in
The Act of Reading (1976) that Iser tries to reconnect the two
lineages, with references to Jakobson, Lotman, Hirsch, Riffaterre,
as well as to some of my remarks of the early sixties.
Such an insistence on the moment of reading, coming from
different directions, seems to reveal a felicitous plot of the Zeitgeist.
And, speaking of the Zeitgeist, it is curious to notice that at the
beginning of the eighties Charles Fillmore, coming from the autonomous and different tradition of generative semantics (critically
reviewed), wrote an essay on "Ideal Readers and Real Readers" without any conscious reference to the above mentioned debates.
Certainly all these author/reader couples do not have the same
theoretical status (see, for a brilliant map of their mutual differences and identities, Pugliatti 1985). In fact, the most important
problem at this juncture is to ascertain whether such a readeroriented field really represented a new trend in aesthetic and
semiotic studies.
The whole history of aesthetics can be traced back to a history
of theories of interpretation and of the effect that a work of art
provokes upon its addressee. I consider response-oriented the
Aristotelian Poetics, pseudo-Longinian aesthetics of the Sublime,
the medieval theories of beauty as the final result of a visio, the
new reading of Aristotle performed by the Renaissance theorists
of drama, many eighteenth-century theories of art and beauty,
most of Kantian aesthetics, not to speak of many contemporary
critical and philosophical approaches, namely:
(a) Russian Formalists, with their notion of "device" as the

way in which the work of art elicits a particular type of
perception
(b) Ingarden's attention to the reading process, his notion of
the literary work as a skeleton or "schematized structure"
to be completed by the reader, and his idea, clearly due
to Husserl's influence, of the dialectics between the work
as an invariant and the plurality of profiles through which
it can be concretized by the interpreter;
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(see Holub

As for contemporary semiotic theories, they took into account
from the beginning the pragmatic moment. Even without speaking
of the central role played by interpretation and "unlimited
semiosis" in C. S. Peirce's thought, it would be enough to remark
that Charles Morris in Foundationsof a Theory of Signs (1938) reminded us that a reference to the role of the interpreter was always
present in Greek and Latin rhetoric, in the communication theory
of the Sophists, and in Aristotle, not to mention Augustine, for
whom signs were characterized by the fact that they produce an
idea in the mind of their receivers.
During the sixties, many of the Italian semiotic approaches
were influenced by the sociological studies on the reception of·
mass media. In 1965 at the convention held in Perugia on the
relationship between television and its audience, I myself, Paolo
Fabbri, and others insisted on the fact that it was not enough to
study what a message says according to the code of its senders,
but one must also study what it says according to the code of its
addressees. The idea of "aberrant decoding," proposed at that
time, was further elaborated in my Lastruttura assente(1968). Thus,
in the sixties the problem of reception was posited (or re-posited)
by semiotics as a reaction against (i) the structuralist idea that a
textual object was something independent of its interpretations,
and (ii) the stiffness of many formal semantics flourishing in the
Anglo-Saxon area, where the very meaning of a term or a sentence
was studied as independent of its context. Only later this dictionary-like semantics was challenged by encyclopedia-like models
that tried to introduce into the core of the semantic representation
also pragmatic elements-and only recently Cognitive Science and
Artificial Intelligence have decided that an encyclopedia model
seems to be the most convenient way to represent meaning and
to process texts (see on this debate Eco 1976, 1984).
In order to reach such an awareness, it has been necessary
for linguistics to move toward pragmatic phenomena, and in this
sense the role of speech-act theory should not be underestimated.
In the literary domain, Iser (1972) was probably the first to acknowledge the convergence between the new linguistic perspectives
and the literary theory of reception, devoting as he did a whole
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chapter of Der Akt des Lesensto the problems raised by Austin and
Searle (five years before the first organic attempt to elaborate a
theory of literary discourse based upon the speech-act theory; see
Pratt 1977).
Thus, what Jauss in 1969 was announcing as a profound
change in the paradigm of literary scholarship was in fact a general
change taking place already in the semiotic paradigm as welleven though, as I said, this change was not a brand-new discovery
but rather the complex concoction of different venerable approaches that had characterized at different times the whole history of aesthetics and a great part of the history of semiotics.
Nevertheless, it is not true that nihil sub sole novi. Old (theoretical)
objects can reflect a different light under the sun's rays, according
to the season.
I remember how outrageous sounded to many my Operaaperta
(1962), in which I stated that artistic and literary works, by foreseeing a system of psychological, cultural, and historical expectations
on the part of their addressees, try to produce what Joyce called
an "ideal reader ." 1
Obviously, speaking at that time of works of art, I was interested in the fact that such an ideal reader was obliged to suffer
from an ideal insomnia in order to question the book ad infinitum.
My problem was how and to what extent a text should foresee
the reactions of its addressee. In Operaaperta-at least at the time
of the first Italian edition, written between 1957 and 1962-1 was
still moving in a pre-semiotic area, inspired as I was by Information
Theory, the semantics of Richards, the epistemology of Piaget,
Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of perception, transactional
psychology, and the aesthetic theory of interpretation of Luigi
Pareyson. In that book, and with a jargon I would not use today,
I was writing:
now we must shift our attention from the message, as a source of
possible information, to the communicative relationship between
message and addressee, where the interpretative decision of the
receptor contributes to establishing the value of the possible information . . .. If one wants to analyze the possibilities of a communicative structure one must take into account the receptor pole. To
consider this psychological pole means to acknowledge the formal
possibility-as such indispensable in order to explain both the structure and the effect of the message-by which a message signifies
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only insofar as it is interpreted from the point of view of a given
situation, a psychological as well as a historical, social and anthropological one. 2

All these assumptions sounded pretty polemical in the sixties
because the structuralistic orthodoxy was still standing under the
standards of the "aesthetic-formalist" third paradigm designed by
Jauss (1969). In 1967, speaking in the course of an interview of
my book Opera aperta, just translated into French, Claude LeviStrauss said that he was reluctant to accept my perspective because
a work of art
is an object endowed with precise properties, that must be analytically isolated, and this work can be entirely defined on the grounds
of such properties. When Jakobson and myself tried to make a
structural analysis of a Baudelaire sonnet, we did not approach it
as an "open work" in which we could find everything that has
been filled in by the following epochs; we approached it as an
object which, once created, had the stiffness-so to speak-of a
crystal; we confined ourselves to bringing into evidence these properties. (Levi-Strauss 1969:81)

I have already discussed this opinion in the introductory chapter of my The Role of the Reader, making it clear that, by stressing
the role of the interpretative choice in the making up of the sense
of a text, I was not assuming that in an "open work" one can find
that "everything" has been filled in by its different empiricalreaders, irrespective or in spite of the properties of the textual objects.
I was, on the contrary, assuming that an artistic text contained,
among its major analyzable properties, certain structural devices
that encourage and elicit interpretative choices. However, I am
quoting that old discussion in order to show how very daring it
was, during the sixties, to introduce the interpretative moment,
or, if one wants, the act of reading, into the description and the
evaluation of the text to be read.
Even though I stressed in Operaapertathe role of the interpreter ready to risk an ideal insomnia in order to pursue infinite
interpretations , I insisted on the fact that one ought always to
question a text as an object, and not on the mere grounds of one's
personal drives. Depending as I did on the aesthetics of interpretation of Luigi Pareyson, I was still speaking of a dialectic between
fidelity and freedom. I am insisting on this point because if during
the "structuralist sixties" my addressee-oriented position (neither
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so provocative nor so unbearably original) appeared so very "radical," today it would sound pretty conservative, at least from the
point of view of the most radical reader-response theories.
3. A WEB OF CRITICAL

OPTIONS

The opposition between the generative approach (according
to which the theory isolates the rules for the production of a
textual object that can be understood independently of its effects)
and interpretive approach is not homogeneous with the threefold
contrast, widely discussed in the course of a secular critical debate,
between interpretation as the search for the intentio auctoris, interpretation as the search for the intentio operis, and interpretation
as the imposition of the intentio lectoris.
The classical debate aimed at finding in a text either (a) what
its author intended to say, or (b) what the text said independently
of the intentions of its author.
Only after we accepted the second horn of the dilemma did
the question become whether to find in a text (i) what it says by
virtue of its textual coherence and of an original underlying signification system, or (ii) what the addressees find in it by virtue of
their own systems of signification or their wishes and drives.
Such a debate is of paramount importance, but its terms only
partially overlap the opposition generation/interpretation.
One
can describe a text as generated according to certain rules without
assuming that its author intentionally and consciously followed
them. One can adopt a hermeneutic viewpoint without prejudging
whether the interpretation must find what the author meant or
what Being says through language-in the second case, without
prejudging whether the voice of Being is influenced by the drives
of the addressee or not. If one crosses the opposition generation/interpretation with the trichotomy of intentions, one can get six
potential different theories and critical methods.
Facing the possibility, displayed by a text, of eliciting infinite
or indefinite interpretations, the Middle Ages and the Renaissance
reacted by means of two different hermeneutic options. Medieval
interpreters looked for a plurality of senses without rejecting a
sort of identity principle (a text cannot support contradictory interpretations), while the symbolists of the Renaissance, following
the idea of the coincidentiaoppositorum, defined the ideal text as
the one that allows the most contradictory readings (see Eco 1985).
Moreover, the adoption of the Renaissance model generates
a secondary contradiction, since a hermetico-symbolic reading can
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search in a text either for (i) the infinity of senses planned by the
author or for (ii) the infinity of senses that the author ignored.
Naturally, option (ii) generates a further choice; namely, whether
these unforeseen senses are discovered because of the intentio
operis, or in spite of it, forced into the text by an arbitrary decision
of the reader.
Even if one says, as Valery did, that il n'y a pas de vrai sens
d'un texte, one has not yet decided on which of the three intentions
the infinity of interpretations depends. Medieval and Renaissance
Kabbalists maintained that the Torah was open to infinite interpretations because it could be rewritten in infinite ways by combining
its letters, but such an infinity of readings (as well as of writings)certainly dependent on the initiative of the reader-was nonetheless planned by the divine Author.
To privilege the initiative of the reader does not necessarily
mean to guarantee the infinity of readings. If one privileges the
initiative of the reader, one must also consider the possibility of
an active reader who decides to read a text univocally: it is a
privilege of fundamentalists to read the Bible according to a single
literal sense.
We can conceive of an aesthetics claiming that poetic texts
can be infinitely interpreted because their authors wanted them
to read this way; or an aesthetics which claims that texts must be
read univocally in spite of the intentions of their authors who are
compelled by the laws of language and who, once they have
written something, are bound to read what they wrote in the only
authorized and possible sense. One can read as infinitely interpretable a text conceived as absolutely univocal (see for instance the
reading performed by Derrida upon a text of Searle in "Signature,
evenement, contexte") as well as one can perform psychedelic
trips upon a text that cannot be but univocal according to the
intentio operis (for instance, when one muses oneirically upon the
railway timetable). Alternatively, one can read as univocal a text
that its author wanted infinitely interpretable (it would be the
case of fundamentalists if by chance Kabbalists were right), or to
read univocally a text that from the point of view of linguistic
rules should be considered rather ambiguous (for instance, reading Oedipus Rex as a plain mystery story where what counts is
only to find out the guilty one).
It is in the light of this embarrassingly vast typology that we
should reconsider many contemporary critical currents that can
superficially be ranked, all together, under the heading of response-oriented theories. For instance, classical sociology of liter-
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ature records what readers do with a text, and it can remain
basically uninterested in deciding on which intention what they
do depends-since
it simply describes social usages, socialized
interpretations, and the actual public effect of texts, not the formal
devices or the hermeneutic mechanisms that have produced them.
On the contrary, the aesthetics of reception maintains that a literary work is enriched by the various interpretations it underwent
along the centuries and, while considering the dialectic between
textual devices and the horizon of expectations of the readers,
does not deny that every interpretation can and must be compared
with the textual object and with the intentio operis. Likewise, the
semiotic theories of interpretative cooperation, like my theory of
Model Reader, look at the textual strategy as a system of instructions
aimed at producing a possible reader whose profile is designed
by and within the text, can be extrapolated from it, and described
independently of and even before any empirical reading.
In a totally different way, the most radical practices of deconstruction privilege the initiative of the reader and reduce the text
to an ambiguous bunch of still unshaped possibilities, thus transforming texts into mere stimuli for the interpretative drift.
4. AN APOLOGY

FOR THE LITERAL SENSE

Every discourse on the freedom of interpretation must start
from a defense of literal sense. In 1985 Ronald Reagan, during a
microphone test before a public speech, said P (namely : "In a few
minutes I'll push the red button and I'll start bombing the Soviet
Union," or something to that effect). P was-as Linear Text Manifestation-an English sentence that according to common codes
means exactly what it intuitively means. If you prefer, given an
intelligent machine with paraphrase rules, P could be translated
as "the person uttering the pronoun I will in the next 200 seconds
send American missiles toward Soviet territory ." If texts have
intentions, P had the intention to say so.
The newsmen who heard P wondered whether its utterer too
had the intention to say so. Asked about that, Reagan said that
he was joking . He said so-as far as the intentio operis was concerned-but according to the intentio auctorishe only pretendedto
say so. According to common sense, those who believed that the
sentence-meaning coincided with the intended authorial-meaning
were wrong.
In criticizing severely Reagan's joke some journalists, however, tried to make an innuendo (intentio lectoris)and inferred that
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the real intention of Reagan was to nonchalantly suggest that he
was such a tough guy that, if he wanted, he could have done
what he only pretended to do (also because he had the performative power of doing things with words).
This story is scarcely suitable for my purposes because it is
a report about a fact-that is, about a "real" communicative intercourse during which senders and addressees had the chance to
check the discrepancies between sentence-meaning and authorialmeaning. Let us suppose, then, that this story does not concern
a fact, but is a pure story (told in the form "Once a man said
so-and-so, and people believed so-and so, and then that man
added so-and-so ... "). In this case we have lost any guarantee
about the authorial intention, this author having simply become
one of the characters of the narration. How do we interpret this
story? It can be the story of a man making a joke, the story of a
man who jokes but shouldn't, the story of a man who pretends
to joke but as a matter of fact is uttering a threat, the story of a
tragic world where even innocent jokes can be taken seriously,
the story of how the same jocular sentence can change in meaning
according to the status and the role of its utterer .... Would we
say that this story has a single sense, all the listed ones, or that
only some of them can be considered as the "correct" ones?
Two years ago Derrida wrote me a letter to inform me that
he and other people were establishing in Paris a College International de Philosophie and to ask me for a letter of support . I bet
that Derrida was assuming that:
• I had to assume that he was telling the truth ;
• I had to read his program as a univocal discourse as far as both the
the actual situation and his projects were concerned;
• My signature requested at the end of my letter would have been
taken more seriously than Searle's one at the end of "Signature,
evenement , contexte."

Naturally, according to my Erwartungshorizon,Derrida's letter
could have assumed for me many other additional meanings, even
the most contradictory ones, and could have elicited many additional inferences about its "intended meaning"; nevertheless, any
additional inference ought to be based upon its first layer of allegedly literal meaning. I think that Derrida could not but agree
with me: in Grammatologyhe reminds his readers that
[without] all the instruments of traditional criticism . .. critical
production would risk developing in any direction at all, and au-
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thorize itself to say almost anything. But this indispensable guardrail has always only protected,it has never opened, a reading. [158
of the English tr.]

I feel sympathetic with the project of opening readings but I
also feel the fundamental duty of protecting them in order to open
them, since I consider it risky to open in order to protect. Thus,
coming to Reagan's story, my conclusion is that, in order to extrapolate from it any possible sense, one is first of all obliged to
recognize that it has a literal sense, namely, that on a given day
a man said P and that P, according to the English code, means
what it intuitively means.
5.

Two LEVELS OF INTERPRETATION

Before going further ahead with the problem of interpretation,
we must first settle a terminological question. We must distinguish
between semantic and critical interpretation (or, if one prefers,
between semiosicand semioticinterpretation). Semantic interpretation is the result of the process by which an addressee, facing a
linear textual manifestation, fills it up with a given meaning . Every
response-oriented approach deals first of all with this type of
interpretation, which is a natural semiosic phenomenon. Critical
interpretation is, on the contrary, a metalinguistic activity-a
semiotic approach-which
aims at describing and explaining for
which formal reasons a given text produces a given response (and
in this sense it can also assume the form of an aesthetic analysis).
In this sense every text is susceptible to being both semantically and critically interpreted, but only few texts consciously
foresee both kinds of response. Ordinary sentences uttered by a
layman (like "Give me that bottle" or "The cat is on the mat")
only expect a semantic response. On the contrary, aesthetic texts
or sentences such as "The cat is on the mat" uttered by a linguist
as an example of possible semantic ambiguity also foresee a critical
interpreter. Likewise, when I say that every text designs its own
Model Reader, I am in fact implying that many texts aim at producing two Model Readers: a first or naive level, supposed to
understand semantically what the text says, and a second or critical
level, supposed to appreciate the way in which the text says such
an utterance. A sentence like "They are flying planes" foresees a
naive reader who keeps wondering which meaning to chooseand who supposedly looks at the textual environment or at the
circumstance of the utterance in order to support the best choice-
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and a critical reader able to univocally and formally explain the
syntactic reasons that make the sentence ambiguous. Similarly, a
mystery tale displays an astute narrative strategy in order to produce a naive Model Reader eager to fall into the traps of the
narrator (to feel fear or to suspect the innocent one), but usually
wants to produce also a critical Model Reader able to enjoy, at a
second reading, the brilliant narrative strategy by which the firstlevel naive reader has been designed. 3
In the light of the above observations, let me now discuss a
distinction between two interpretative theories of our time proposed by Richard Rorty in his essay "Idealism and Textualism"
(in Consequencesof Pragmatism,1982). Rorty says that in the present
century "there are people who write as if there were nothing but
texts," and he makes a distinction between two kinds of textualisms. The first is instantiated by those who disregard the intention of the author and look in the text for a principle of internal
coherence and/or for a sufficient cause for certain very precise
effects it has on a presumed ideal reader. The second is instantiated
by those critics who consider every reading as a misreading (the
"misreaders"). For them, says Rorty, "the critic asks neither the
author nor the text about their intentions but simply beats the
text into a shape which will serve his own purpose. He makes
the text refer to whatever is relevant to that purpose." In this
sense their model
is not the curious collector of clever gadgets taking
see what makes them work and carefully ignoring
end they may have, but the psychoanalyst blithely
dream or a joke as a symptom of homicidal mania.

them apart to
any extrinsic
interpreting a
(151)

Rorty thinks that both positions are a form of pragmatism
(pragmatism being for him the refusal to think of truth as correspondence to reality-and reality being, I assume, both the external referent of the text and the intention of its author) and suggests
that the first type of theorist is a weak pragmatist because "he
thinks that there really is a secret and that once it's discovered
we shall have gotten the text right," so that for him "criticism is
discovery rather than creation" (152). On the contrary, the strong
pragmatist does not make any difference between finding and
making.
I can accept such a characterization, but with two emendations.
First of all, in which sense does a weak pragmatist, when
trying to find the secret of a text, aim at getting this text "right"?

DIFFERENT/A

160

One has to decide if by "getting the text right" one means a right
semantic or a right critical interpretation. Those readers who,
according to the Jamesian metaphor proposed by Iser (1976:ch.1),
look into a text in order to find in it "the figure in the carpet," a
single unrevealed secret meaning, are-I think-looking for a sort
of "concealed" semantic interpretation. But the critic looking for
the "secret code" probably looks critically for the describable
strategy that produces infinite ways to get a text semanticallyright.
To analyze and describe the textual "devices" of Ulyssesmeans to
show how Joyce acted in order to create many alternative figures
in his carpet, without deciding how many they can be and which
of them are the best ones. Obviously, since even a critical reading
is always conjectural (see 6, below), there can be many ways of
finding out that secret code, but to look for it does not mean that
one wants to reduce a text to a univocal semantic reading. Thus,
I do not think that the first type of textualist designed by Rorty
is necessarily a "weak" pragmatist.
Secondly, I suspect that many "strong" pragmatists are not
pragmatists at all-at least in Rorty's sense, because the "misreader" employs a text in order to know something which stands
outside the text-and that is in some way more "real" than the
text itself, namely, the unconscious mechanism of la chafne signifiante. In any case, even though a pragmatist, certainly the misreader is not a "textualist." Probably misreaders think, as Rorty
assumes, that there is nothing but texts. However, they are interested in every possible text except the one they are reading.
As a matter of fact, "strong" pragmatists are only concerned with
the infinite semantical readings of the text they are beating about,
but I suspect that they are scarcely interested in the way it works.
6. INTERPRETATION

AND USE

I can accept the distinction proposed by Rorty but I see it as
a convenient opposition between interpreting (both semantically
and critically) and merely using a text. To critically interpret a text
means to read it in order to discover, along with my reactions to
it, something about its nature. To use a text is to start from a
stimulus in order to get something else, even accepting the risk
of misinterpreting it from the semantical point of view. If I tear
out the pages of my Bible and wrap my pipe tobacco in them, I
am using this Bible, but it would be daring to call me a textualisteven though I am, if not a strong pragmatist, certainly a very
pragmatic person. If I get sexual enjoyment from a pornographic
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book, I am not using it, because in order to elaborate my sexual
fantasies I had to semantically interpret its sentences. On the
contrary, if-let us suppose-I look into the Elements of Euclid to
infer that their author was a scopophiliac, obsessed with abstract
images, then I am using it because I refuse to interpret its definitions and theorems semantically.
The quasi-psychoanalytic reading that Derrida makes of Poe's
"Purloined Letter" in Lefacteur de la verite represents a good critical
interpretation of that story. Derrida insists on the fact that he is
not analyzing the unconscious of the author but rather the unconscious of the text. He is interpreting because he respects the intentio
operis. When he draws an interpretation from the fact that the
letter is found in a paper holder hanging from a nail under the
center of a fireplace, he first takes "literally" the possible world
designed by the narration as well as the sense of the words used
by Poe to set up this world. Then he tries to isolate a second
"symbolical" meaning that this text is conveying, probably beyond
the intentions of its author. Right or wrong, Derrida however
does support his second-level semantic interpretation with textual
evidence. In doing so, he also performs a critical interpretation
because he shows how the text can produce that second-level
semantic meaning.
On the contrary, let us consider the way followed by Maria
Bonaparte when analyzing Poe's work. Part of her reading represents a good example of interpretation. For instance, she reads
"Morella," "Ligeia," and "Eleonora" and shows that all three texts
have the same underlying "fabula": a man in love with an exceptional woman who dies of consumption, so that the man swears
eternal grief; but he does not keep his promise and loves another
woman; finally, the dead one reappears and wraps the new one
in the mantle of her funereal power. In a nontechnical way, Maria
Bonaparte identifies in these three texts the same actantial structures, speaks of the structure of an obsession, but reads that
obsession as a textual one, and in doing this reveals the intentio
operis. Unfortunately, such a beautiful textual analysis is interwoven with biographical remarks that connect textual evidence with
aspects (known by extra textual sources) of Poe's private life. When
she says that Poe was dominated by the impression he felt as a
child when he saw his mother, dead of consumption, lying on
the catafalque, when she says that in his adult life and in his work
he was so morbidly attracted by women with funereal features,
when she reads his stories populated by living corpses in order
to explain his personal nechrophilia-then
she is using and not
interpreting texts.
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AND CONJECTURE

It is clear that I am trying to keep a dialectical link between
intentio operis and intentio lectoris. The problem is that, if one
perhaps knows what is meant by "intention of the reader," it
seems more difficult to define abstractly what is meant by "intention of the text ."
The text intention is not displayed by the Text Linear Manifestation. Or, if it is displayed, it is so in the sense of the purloined
letter. One has to decide to "see" it. Thus, it is possible to speak
of text intention only as the result of a conjecture on the part of
the reader. The initiative of the reader basically consists in making
a conjecture about the text intention.
A text is a device conceived in order to produce its Model
Reader. I repeat that this Reader is not the one who makes the
only right conjecture. A text can foresee a Model Reader entitled
to try infinite conjectures. The empirical reader is only an actor
who makes conjectures about the kind of Model Reader postulated
by the text . Since the intention of the text is basically to produce
a Model Reader able to make conjectures about it, the initiative
of the Model Reader consists in figuring out a Model Author who
is not the empirical one and that, in the end, coincides with the
intention of the text.
Thus, more than a parameter to use in order to validate the
interpretation, the text is an object that the interpretation builds
up in the course of the circular effort of validating itself on the
basis of what it makes up as its result. I am not ashamed to admit
that in so doing, I am defining the old and still valid hermeneutic
circle.
The logic of interpretation is the Peircian logic of abduction
(see Eco and Sebeok 1984). To make a conjecture means to figure
out a Law that can explain a Result. The "secret code" of a text
is such a Law. One could say that in natural sciences the conjecture
has to try only the Law, since the Result is under everybody's
eyes, while in textual interpretation only the discovery of a "good"
Law makes the Result acceptable. But I do not think that the
difference is so clear-cut. Even in natural sciences no fact can be
taken as a significant Result without our having first and vaguely
decided that this fact can be selected among innumerable others
as a curious Result to be explained. To isolate a fact as a curious
Result means to have already obscurely thought of a Law of which
that fact could be the Result. When I start reading a text I never
know, from the beginning, if I am approaching it from the point
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of view of a suitable intention. My initiative starts becoming exciting when I discover that my intention could meet the intention
of that text.
How does one prove a conjecture about the intentio operis?
The only way is to check it against the text as· a coherent whole.
This idea, too, is an old one and comes from Augustine (Dedoctrina
christiana):any interpretation given of a certain portion of a text
can be accepted if it is confirmed, and must be rejected if it is
challenged, by another portion of the same text. In this sense the
internal textual coherence controls the otherwise uncontrollable
drives of the reader.
Once Borges suggested that it would be exciting to read the
Imitation of Christ as if it was written by Celine. The game is
amusing and could be intellectually fruitful. With certain texts it
could yield new and interesting interpretations. It cannot, however, work with Thomas a Kempis. I tried: I discovered sentences
that could have been written by Celine ("Grace loves low things
and is not disgusted by thorny ones, and likes filthy clothes").
But this kind of reading offers a suitable "grid" for very few sentences of the Imitation. Most of the book submits very reluctantly
to this reading. If, on the contrary, I read the book according to
the Christian Medieval encyclopedia, it appears textually coherent
in each of its parts.
Besides, no responsible deconstructionist has ever challenged
such a position. Hillis Miller (1980) said that "the readings of
deconstructive criticism are not the willful imposition by a subjectivity of a theory on the texts, but are coerced by the texts themselves" (611). Elsewhere (Thomas Hardy: Distance and Desire) he
writes that
it is not true that . . . all readings are equally valid. . . . Some
readings are certainly wrong ....
To reveal one aspect of a work
of an author often means ignoring or shading other aspects ....
Some approaches reach more deeply into the structure of the text
than others. (ix)
8. THE FALSIFIABILITY

OF MISINTERPRETATIONS

We can thus accept a sort of Popper-like principle according
to which if there are no rules that help to ascertain which interpretations are the "best ones," there is at least a rule for ascertaining
which ones are "bad." As mentioned above, this rule says that
the internal coherence of a text must be taken as a parameter for
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its interpretations. But in order to do so one needs, at least for a
short time, a metalanguage which permits the comparison between a given text and its semantical or critical interpretation.
Since any new interpretation enriches the text and the text consists
of its objective Linear Manifestation plus the interpretations it
received in the course of history, this metalanguage should also
allow for the comparison between a new and an old interpretation.
I understand that from the point of view of a radical deconstruction theory such an assumption can sound unpleasantly
neopositivistic, and that Derrida's notion of deconstruction and
drift challenges the very possibility of a metalanguage. But a
metalanguage does not have to be different from (and more powerful than) ordinary language. The idea of interpretation requires
that a "piece" of ordinary language be used as the interpretant (in
the Peircian sense) of another "piece" of ordinary language. When
one says that man means "human male adult," one is interpreting
ordinary language through ordinary language, and the second
"sign"-Peirce observes-is the interpretant of the first one, just
as the first can become the interpretant of the second one.
The metalanguage of interpretation is not different from its
object language . It is a portion of the same language and, in this
sense, to interpret is a function that every language performs
when it speaks of itself. It is not the case of asking if this can be
done. We are doing it, everyday.
The provocative self-evidence of my last argument suggests
that we can prove it only by showing that any of its alternatives
is self-contradictory.
Let us suppose that there is a theory that literally(not metaphorically) asserts that every interpretation is a misinterpretation.
Let us suppose that there are two texts O'. and 13and that we
have submitted them to a reader in order to elicit his/her textually
recorded misinterpretation I.
Take a literate subject X, previously informed that any interpretation must be a misinterpretation, and give him/her the
three texts O'., 13and I.
Ask X if I misinterprets O'. or 13.
Supposing that X says that I is a misinterpretation of O'.,
would we say that Xis right? Supposing, on the contrary, that X
says that I is a misinterpretation of 13,would we say that X is
wrong?
In both cases, to approve or to disapprove of X's answer
means to believe not only that a text controls and selects its own
interpretations but also that it controls and selects its own misin-
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terpretations. The one approving or disapproving of X's answers
would then act as one who does not really believe that every
interpretation is a misinterpretation, since he/she would use the
original text as a parameter for discriminating between texts that
misinterpret it and texts that misinterpret something else. This
move would presuppose a previous interpretation of a which
should be considered the only correct one, as well as a metalanguage which describes a and shows on which grounds I is or is
not a misinterpretation of it.
It would be embarrassing to maintain that a text elicits only
misinterpretations except when it is correctly interpreted by the
warrant of the misinterpretations of other readers. But this is
exactly what happens with a radical theory of misinterpretation.
There is another way to escape the contradiction. One should
assume that every answer of Xis the good one. I can be indifferently the misinterpretation of a, of 13,and of any other possible
text. But at this point why define I (which is undoubtedly a text
in its own right) as the misinterpretation of something else? If it
is the misinterpretation of everything, it then is the misinterpretation of nothing. It exists for its own sake and does need to be
compared with any other text.
The solution is elegant, but its result a little inconvenient. It
destroys the very category of textual interpretation. There are
texts, but of these nobody can speak. Or, if one speaks, nobody
can say what one says. Texts, at most, are used as stimuli to
produce other texts, but once a new text is produced, it cannot
be referred to its stimulus.
9. CONCLUSIONS

To defend the rights of interpretation against the mere use
of a text does not mean that texts must never be used. We are
using texts everyday and we need to do it, for many respectable
reasons. It is only important to distinguish use from interpretation.
A critical reader could also say why certain texts have been
used in a certain way, finding in their structure the reasons of
their use or misuse. In this sense a sociological analysis of the
free uses of texts can support a further interpretation of them.
In any case, use and interpretation are abstract theoretical
possibilities. Every empirical reading is always an unpredictable
mixture of both. It can happen that a play started as use, ends
by producing a fruitful new interpretation--or vice versa. Sometimes to use texts means to free them from previous interpreta-
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tions, to discover new aspects of them, to realize that previously
they had been illicitly interpreted, to find out a new and more
explicative intentio operis, that too many uncontrolled intentions
of the readers (perhaps disguised as a faithful quest for the intention of the author) had polluted and obscured it.
There is also a pretextual reading, performed not in order to
interpret the text but to show how much language can produce
unlimited semiosis. Such a pretextual reading has a philosophical
function, and many of the examples of deconstruction provided
by Derrida belong to this kind of activity. It so happened that a
legitimate philosophical practice has been taken as a model for
literary criticism and for a new trend in textual interpretation.
Our theoretical duty was to acknowledge that this happened
and to show why it should not have happened.

Notes
1. I realize now that my idea of system of expectations, even though built
up on the grounds of other theoretical influences, was not so dissimilar from
Jauss' notion of Erwartungshorizon.
2. In Operaaperta, 2d ed., pp. 131-32, I was considering under the headings
of "work of art" not only literary texts but also paintings, cinema, television. I
am grateful to Wolfgang Iser (1976) for observing not only that some of my
remarks on nonverbal arts were also relevant for literature (ch. 5), but also (ch.
3) that my further discussion on iconic signs (Eco 1968) was in support of the
idea that even literary signs designate "the conditions of conception and perception which enable the observer to construct the object intended by the sign"
and therefore "constitute an organization of signifiers which do not serve to
designate a signified object, but instead designate the instructions for the production of the signified."
3. One could say that, while the semantic reader is planned or instructed
by the verbal strategy, the critical one is such on the grounds of a mere interpretive
decision-nothing
in the text appearing as an explicit appeal to a second-level
reading. But it must be noted that many artistic devices, for instance stylistical
violation of the norm, or defamiliarization, seem to work exactly as self-focusing
appeals: the text is made in such a way as to attract the attention of a critical
reader. Moreover, there are texts that explicitly require a second-level reading.
Take for instance Agatha Christie's TheMurder of RogerAckroyd, which is narrated
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by a character who, at the end, will be discovered by Poirot as the murderer.
After his confession, the narrator informs the readers that, if they had paid due
attention, they could have understood in which precise moment he committed
his crime because in some reticent way he did say it. See also my analysis of
Allais's "Un drame bien parisien" (Eco 1979), where it is shown to what extent
the text, while deceiving, step by step, naive readers, at the same time provides
them with many clues that could have prevented them from falling into the
textual trap. Obviously, these clues can be detected only in the course of a
second reading.
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